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AVIRTING A TRANSATLANTIC TRAD! I 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has been concerned 
to note the growth of sentiment within the United States 
Congress and elsewhere in favour of some form of legislation to 
deal with the serious imbalance of US trade with Japan and 
other Pacific basin countries in particular. There is a risk 
that transatlantic trade could be affected by legislation aimed 
primarily elsewhere; at the same time, any bilateral 
arrangements on individual classes of goods could lead to 
further pressure on the already serious imbalance of trade 
between Japan an$! the European Community (EC). This memorandum 
sets out grounds for the CBI's views that: 
(i) The GATT machinery must be made to work; there is no 
sensible alternative to a multilateral approach to the 
present trade problems. · 
(ii) The Japanese market must he as open to United States and 
European imports as our markets are to Japanese imports; 
obviously 'protectionist' measures by the Japanese must 
he removed, since they could well spark a 'tit-for-tat' 
response which could place political leaders in the West 
under great pressure to legislate. 
The memoranaum 18 lD tnre• v•rL~. PJ••L i~ J~n~~L~~~ ~h~ 
background, drawing attentton to the importance of US/UK 
trading and investment J.inxa. Next, the memur•mlu.1u aummariees 
&.tu, CDI '• pol1c,. Oft tJlado matt••• and nnrto1'"11 n ... A t.hA 1 mi,ortance 
I.hat. B.l· 1 ti•h buai ncoo attaohoe to f,-•• ant.I nr,•n t.1"11 tip. 
Finally. the memorandum draws attention to some particular 
aspects of legislation now before the Con~resa. 
BACKOBOOND 
The United Kingdom 1• a trad1ne natton. Exports of «ooda and 
services contribute 301 to the Gross Domestic Product. This is 
somewhat higher than the comparable fiRUrA for France and Italy 
and well above the figures for Japan, and the United States, 
where 1t was under 81 in 1985, according to OECD fi~ures. Any 
threat to the international free trade ot goods and services is 
therefore extremely serious from the British point of view. 
TOtal tr&ae Oetwe~u Lh~ U"1L~~ Otatee And the Unitod Kingdom 
(wacludin1 'inviaiblca') in 1986 was worth ~om11 $26 hillion. 
with a balance in the UK favour of just under $4 billion. This 
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year. The table below sets out the OECD statistics on US trade 
in summary form. 
Table: UNITED STATES TRADE, 1986 
$ billion 
Imports F.xports Balance 
from to 
Rest of the World 211.9 136.0 (75.9) 
Japan 80.8 27.0 (53.8) 
EEC (total) 75.2 51.5 (23.7) 
West Germany 24.6 9.9 (14.7) 
UK 15.2 11. 2 (4.0) 
Of course, the United Kingdom and the United States have long 
enjoyed a mutuaily beneficial trading and investment 
relationship. For example: 
British business is the biggest investor in the United 
States, which accounts for around half of total UK 
overseas investment. The total investment portfolio in 
the United States of British business is now worth more 
than $40 billion; and British companies provide 
employment in every State and most Congressional 
districts. 
Similarly, United States-owned businesses have invested 
very heavily in the United Kingdom, which accounts for 
over ,oi of US investment in the European community. us 
investments in Britain ~t the end of 1984 war$ worth over 
$30 billion [the CBI is proud to include among its 
mP.mh~r~ a number of us multi-nationals who nave operated 
in the United Kingdom successfully for a very long 
time]. 
The CBI ilD concerned at any threat, howP.vP.r inciirP.~t it may at 
first seem, to the maintenance of free and open trade across 
the Atlantic. Any unfavourable developments could have very 
aeriouG consequences, which ~ould not P~~ily he confined to the 
economic sphere alone. 
CBI TRADB POSITION 
The CBI shares the view, apparently held by leading memhers of 
the US Congress, that trade legislation can have no significant 
effect on the US trade deficit. It is impossible to consider 
trade balances in isolation from the influence of international 
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economic and monetary forces, and relative international com-
petitiveness, The effect on the us trade deficit of tighter 
provisions to counter unfair trade is dwarfed by the effects of 
the volumes of money that pass across exchange markets every 
day. 
Indeed, by boosting inflationary pressures, protective trade 
legislation threatens the very source of funding for the 
current and projected US Federal Government deficit. This in 
turn would increase the likelihood of recession in the US, with 
all that implies for jobs and prosperity across the board. 
Moreover, artificial restraints on imports cannot be beneficial 
in the end, since they provide relief from the need to meet 
fair competitive pressures - though the competition must, of 
course, indeed be fair. And, when this becomes clear, 
dismantling legislation can often be a slow process. 
The main concern of the CBI is that protectionism in the United 
States should not have long term detrimental effects on 
US/European trade relations when most of the protectionist 
sentiment stems from the understandable frustration with the 
persistent and structural Japanese trade surplus with the 
United States. le are also concerned that overtly 
protectionist measures will undermine, perhaps fatally, the 
Uruguay Round o( multilateral trade negotiations. The Textile 
and Apparel Act of 1987 would, for example, be in direct 
conflict with the standstill and rollback agreements concluded 
as part of launching the Urugu~y Round. This would mean a loss 
of credibility in the ability of the maJor C9ntracting Parties 
to GATT to fulf111 their commitments. The view that GATT is 
ineffective will then become a self-fulfilling prophecy; there 
will be more recourse to unilateral actions and the 
protectionist screw will have been given another full turn. 
We-in Europe face similar protectionist pressures. Together 
with its sister federations of industry in Europe the CBI is in 
the forefront of efforts to prevent Europe closing in upon 
itself (including reform of the Common Agricultural Policy). 
We seek a strong and outward-looking Burope. This means the 
creation of a genuine internal market for Europe hut one which 
is open to the world. 
If the United States moves to resolve trade tensions 
unilaterally it will be difficult if not impossible to resist 
pressures for Europe to follow suit. With a market larger than 
that of the United States there are those who believe in 
"fortress-Europe" policies augmented with bilateral trade 
agreements in North-South and East-West trade. Protectionist 
pres~ure9 m11Rt thAr~for~ h~ contained on both sides of the 
Atlantic if we are to avoid such a serious weakening of the 
free world's economic and political cohesion. 
All major Contracting Parties to the GATT must share 
responsibility for the burden o! maintaining an open internat-
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ional trading system. This means that Japan must act to remove 
any hindrances that make it a more 'closed' economy than the 
United States or Europe. It also means that the leading Newly 
Industrialising Countries must graduate from developing country 
status in the GATT and assume responsibilities commensurate 
with their economic strength and the real benefits they reap 
from an open trading system. The CBI therefore welcomes 
provision in House and Senate legislation for granting the 
Executive negotiating authority for the Uruguay Round of MTNs. 
It is essential the United States and Europe work together to 
strengthen multilateral remedies for trade disputes. 
CURRINT CBI CONCERNS 
The CBI fully appreciates that significant progress has been 
made over the proposals introduced as HR4800 in 1986. We 
remain concerned, however, about a number of provisions in both 
HR3, as passed by the House and in S490 as reported by the 
Senate Finance Committee. which threaten long-term trade 
relations. In particular the following areas are of particul~r 
concern: 
(1) A unilateral interpretation of "fair trade" by the United 
States. 
(ii) Sector-specific legislation. 
(iii) Restrictions on investment !lows. 
(i) Unilateral interpretation of "fair trade" 
The area of most concern to the CBI involves a number of 
provisions in the draft legislation which take the US further 
down the path of deciding. unilaterally, what constitutes fair 
trade: 
1 Bilateral surpluses/adversarial trade 
HR3: Section 126 (commonly known as the Gephardt 
amendment) provides for mandatory negotiations and action 
recarding countries having excessive and unwarranted 
trade surpluses with the US. Trade deficit problems 
derive from a much wider range of causes than trade 
imbalances and trade imbalances themselves are not 
necessarily improper being typically evidence of 
comparative advantage in certain products. Speci!ying 
that action will only be taken if the surpluses are th~ 
result of "unfair" trade practices helps little if the us 
decides unilaterally what is unfair. 
$490: Section 302 requires the President to negotiate 
elimination of trade barriers with countries showing 
consistent patterns of trade distortion. Whilst this 
provision is preferable to the ~ection 126 of HR3, it 
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still demonstrates a preference for unilateral solutions 
which we consider highly dangerous. We would urge the 
Senate to resist attempts to introduce an amendment 
styled on HR3's section 126. 
2 Mandatory action 
3 
Both HR3 (s. 121) and S490 (s. 304) oblige the President 
to take action under s. 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 if a 
trade agreement is violated. It is recognized that the 
President would retain discretion in other cases, but we 
would urge Congress to allow Presidential override in all 
cases: we are highly concerned that s. 301 might at any 
stage be used against European interests and under these 
circumstances we believe trade negotiators need ma~imum 
flexibility, The European Community would almost 
certainly react sharply to the US-imposed requirement to 
negotiate under duress, and the likelihood of reaching 
negotiated solutions would recede. Mandatory retaliation 
will invite counter-retaliation which in turn will impact 
on US interests. 
New grounds for mandatory action 
The CBI is opposed to the establishment of new specific 
grounds for action ins. 301 cases as none has been 
multilaterally negotiated. In particular we would urge 
careful consideration of the impact of provisions in 
both House and Senate bills on technology transfer. 
Making "unreasonable insistance on the transfer of 
technical information as part of an export deal" 
actionable under s. 301 runs counter to normal practice 
in the agreement of defence contracts. If implemented, 
this provision can only harm US interests as defence 
trading partners would be encouraged to turn to non-US 
suppliers. 
4 Anti-dumping and countervailing duty law: defence trade 
Extension of AD and CVD provisions to governmental 
importations will, equally, impact on the defence trade. 
Existing memoranda of understanding allow exemption for 
the defence trade from AD and CV duties - the provision 
in HR3 which would obliRe the State Department to 
renegotiate those MOUs will have a chilling effect on 
defence trade, which between the UK and the US, stands 
2:1 in the US favour. Implementation of this provision 
can only lead to retaliation by F.uropean governments 
Which will put these US exports at risk. 
5 Anti-dumping and countervailing duty law: general 
Provisions in HR3 on diversionary dumpinR, prtvate right 
of action for damages and the definition of a counter-
vailable subsidy constitute another unilateral extension 
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of US trade remedies which are inconsistent with the 
GATT, Implementation of these provisions can only invite 
retaliation by Europe in the form of mirror legislation. 
6 The 'Brooks' amendment 
This amendment would replace application of the GATT 
procurement code by a unilaterally defined standard, 
allowing the US to judge whether trading partners are 
conforming to that code. This provision would undermine 
a multilateral agreement, already threatened, 
incidentally, by GATT-illegal procurement proposals ins. 
303 of the State Department Authorization Bill. 
Retaliation by countries deemed by the US not to be "in 
good standing" is inevitable. 
7 State Trading 
Section 305 of S490 applies criteria to the commercial 
activities of 'state trading companies' which we consider 
to be unduly restrictive. Such criteria have not been 
negotiated multilaterally and represent another unwelcome 
eitension to the scope of US domestic remedies against 
what it defines unilaterally as unfair trade. 
8 Shipping 
A House provision allows the carriage of more than 251 of 
US trade in a certain commodity by a foreign fleet as 
pr1ma fac1e evidence of the existence.of an unfair trade 
practice: this arithmetical approach to the problem 
constitutes a dangerous oversimplification, and moreover 
is in flagrant violation of US commitment to "standstill 
and rollback" on protectionism in the shipping area. 
Once again, this provision Will almost certainly prompt 
mirror legislation. 
9 Trade Adjustment Assistance lmport Fee 
The Senate provision for the unilateral imposition of an 
import fee to fund the TAA programme is very unwelcome, 
coming as it does on the heels of vartous "user fees" of 
last year (notably the customs user fee) - such a 
provision will agatn invite retaliation from US trading 
parters. 
(ii) Sector-Specific Legislation 
The CBI opposes a sector-specific approach to trade legislation 
- every country may identify sectors in which it is 
disadvantaged, but the way to resolution is through trade-off 
across a range of sectors not throuKh seeking reciprocity on a 
sector by sector basis. This ts an underlying principle of 
trade negotiations, which allows trade agreements to he reachud 
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and which allows the US, for in~tance, to run surpluses in 
sectors where it enjoys advantage, such as aircraft and 
information technology. For this reason we oppose provisions 
in both House and Senate legislation which authorize 
consideration of reciprocal market access as a factor i.n 
determining s, 301 violations. 
Teztiles and Clothing. The CBI warmly welcomes the exclusion 
of the Textile and Apparel Act of 1987 from the omnibus 
provisions of HR3, Setting import growth at 1% for the US is 
unacceptable when imports into the European Community from 
dominant suppliers, like Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, show 
increases of between 301 and 401. It would have an adverse 
•ffeet. nn multilateral trade neentiations and as the European 
Council of Ministers stated on 16 March 1987 they would respond 
to such legislation in accordance with the EEC's rights under 
GATT. Such a chain reaction would inevitably mean the end of 
the Multi Fibre Arrangement, For these reasons the CBI 
believes it is imperative that any effort to reintroduce such 
sector-specific legislation is resisted. 
Telecommunications. G1ven the conver~~nce between data-
processing and telecommunications, trade regulation in one area 
is likely to spread to other information technology-based goods 
and services. Past experience in textiles, clothing and steel 
has clearly shown how controls on one product from a limited 
number of sources inevitably spread as efforts are made to 
counter tne inevitable Lrad~ divereion th~t.takes place. Any 
precedent set in telecommunications customer-premises equipment 
might therefore have very damaging long-term effects on trade 
in a major growth sector of the future. 
European business, in the shape of UNICE (Union of Industrial 
and Employers' Federations of the EC) is urging other European 
countries to follow the lead in liberalisation of 
telecommunications taken by the United Kingdom. 
The proposed le1islation both HR3 and S490, which would empower 
the US to withdraw trade concessions if it is unable to 
neaotiate reciprocal access to foreign telecommunications 
markets, is against the spirit of GATT. The GATT only provides 
for withdrawal of concessions tf another Contracting Party 
prevents its trading partners benefiting from negotiated 
concessions, It does not provide for recourse to retaliation 
simply because one Party is unable to achieve its negotiating 
objectives, 
The CBI fully supports US efforts to liberalise trade in 
telecommunications goods and services, as does UNICE, but ill-
conceived trade protection now woulrt ,seriously .jeopardise these 
efforts. The United States liberalised its domestic 
telecommunications sector, over a period of some twenty years, 
in order to facilitate growth of information-based services. 
Europe cannot be held responsible for the fact that this was 
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done without at the same time seeking to negotiate parallel 
liberalisation of other national network~. 
Steel. We oppose the Pease amendment which unilaterally seeks 
to introduce new origin rules for VRA purposes. Any such 
attempt to extend the scope of restraints in a unilateral 
fashion is certain to invoke a sharp EEC response. 
(111) Restriction oa investment 
(a) Section 703 of the House Trade Bill (HR3) would require a 
forei1n investor who invests in five percent or more of a 
US business enterprise or real estate to supply the 
Department of Commerce with additional detailed 
information about himself and his investment, and such 
proprietary information would be made fully available to 
the public. An identical amendment to the Senate Trade 
Bill had been proposed by Senator Chiles, hut he withdrew 
this after lobbying pressure. Senator Levin will, 
however, propose his own amendment from the Senate floor. 
As far as foreign investment is concerned, the Levin and 
Bryant amendments are both unnecessary and counter-
productive~ 
1 Current reporting requirements for foreign investors are 
more than ample. Foreign purchasers of five percent or 
more of the stock of a publicly traded. company are 
required to register with the SEC. The Treasury 
Department collects aggregate data from brokers on 
foreign portfolio investment in US equities. The 
Commerce Department already collects voluminous data on 
direct foreign investment in the US. The International 
Trade Administration collects data on individual 
transactions and assesses their implications. Any direct 
investments which might negatively affect US national 
interests are reviewed by the Interagency Committee on 
Foreign Investment. In all, si~teen Federal agencies 
currently collect and analy~e data on US foreign 
investment. 
2 Imposition of additional burdensome reporting 
requirements would discourage new foreign investment in 
the US. While the proposed registration system adds 
little new information to that currently available for 
purposes of economic analysis, the public disclosure of 
that information - some of it proprietary - would subject 
foreign investors to more onerous disclosure requirements 
than those for domestic investors. Foreign investment, 
which has helped fuel US economic development, has come 
to this country tor many reasons, not the least of which 
are the United States' long history of respecting private 
property rights and investors' basic rights to financial 
privacy. By limiting these rights, the Levin and Bryant 
••• /9 
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amendment5 would encourage foreigners to take their money 
elsewhere, 
3 In some cases, the new registration requirements may 
actually result in ..Q!!investment. Under both amendments, 
a foreign person who acquired an interest in US property 
prior to enactment a~d continues to hold such interest is 
subject to the registration requirements. Many foreign 
investors may choose to liquidate their US holdings 
rather than submit proprietary information for public 
inspection. Foreign investors may also choose to sell 
their existing US holdings rather than run the risk of 
incurring civil or criminal penalties for failing to 
comply. fully with the new registration requirements. 
4 The Levin and Bryant amendments are certain to result in 
retaliatory measures being adopted by countries which 
currently welcome investment hy US companies. At a time 
when the US is urging its trading partners, in particular 
at the upcoming GATT negotiations, not to discriminate 
against US investment, the Levin and Bryant amendments 
send precisely the wrong signal. 
(b) Section 905 of HR3, known as the Florio amendment 
authorizes the President to block foreign investment 
activities if such activities threaten national ser.urity 
or impair "essential commerce". 
The CBI fully appreciates the considerations of national 
security, but bearing in mind the UK's position as the 
largest foreign investor in the US, we are deeply 
concerned about the potential impact of the above 
provision. The uncertainty created by the vague 
"essential commerce" standard can only act to restrain 
productive and legitimate foreign investment. This 
investment brings direct economi.c benefits to the US and 
we urge the House to delete this provision, and the 
Senate to resist the introduction o! similar provisions. 
Senator Exon is proposing an amendment which tightens up 
the vague "essential commerce" clause and which is not as 
damaging as the proposals in HR3. 
CONCLUSION 
Tbe CBI is sensitive to the prevailing pressures for reform of 
trade le11slation in the US and accepts that the GATT, in its 
present form, represents an imperfect mechanism for the 
resolution of trade disputes. However, the US and the EEC were 
prime movers in the launch o! the latest Uruguay round: at a 
time when such imperfections are up again for discussion and 
when the framework itself is to be enlarged to encompass 
services, investment and intellectual property, legislation 
which subverts this process would be counterproductive. 
Legislation before Congress still contains features which are 
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cause for concern. Structural trade imbalances are not 
sustainable in the long term; and the problem should eventually 
be self correcting through normal competitive pressures on 
business - provided that all markets are equally open. Indeed, 
us export volumes are now moving ahead sharply. In these 
circumstances legislation which adversely affects transatlantic 
trade - directly or otherwise - could both set back the self 
correction process that now seems in train, and have serious 
adverse effects on Anglo-US relations: most of the industries 
likely to be more directly affected by any trade legislation 
are in areas of particularly high unemployment. 
In the long-term interests of US and world business. we urge 
consideration of the points made above, as legislation is 
debated and ultimately passes to conference Committee. 
IA29YAGIH01L July 1987 
